


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THE ARMY DIVISION'S STRUCTURE  
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WHAT IS RIGHT FOR THE ARMY OF 1995 AND BEYOND?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD A. REHM  
United States Army

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The strategic security environment I assumed is a multi-polar world with threats and capabilities across the operational continuum. Fiscal constraints will be a key factor in our future but we are in position to handle it if we are creative and take advantage of our current strengths. It is important to understand what our nation's leaders want our Army to do if we are to provide the right force for the future. My methodology will be to review the process that Col. (Ret) Art Lykke describes as the ends, ways, and means needed to accomplish our mission. I will review our national security interests and objectives as established by the President, from this will flow a national military strategy to provide the concepts for accomplishing the mission. Next must come a doctrinally-based structure to meet the anticipated needs of the Airlant Operations of the future. I have offered three alternative that are changes from our current divisional structure: the first is the currently suggested TRADOC structure which is basically an unchanged division; the second includes a brigade and smaller divisional overhead; and, the third suggest elimination of the division headquarters completely. After comparing advantages and disadvantages of each I have concluded that a fine tuning of our current structure is all that is required and major alterations are unnecessary.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE ARMY DIVISION'S STRUCTURE - WHAT IS RIGHT FOR  
THE ARMY OF 1995 AND BEYOND?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. Rehm

Colonel (Ret) Michael Morin  
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
5 April 1991



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## Abstract

AUTHOR: Donald A. Rehm, LTC, IN

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This paper challenges whether the current division structure can remain as the base of maneuver considering the impacts force reductions and the revision of the current Airland Operations doctrine will have on our Army. The structure of our Table of Organization (TOE) army has been centered on the division since World War I. As we look towards the requirements to downsize our total force, as a result of the victory of Cold War I, we must not be comfortable with a business as usual approach. I intend to challenge this paradigm and will offer my thoughts regarding the size and makeup of our tactical structure of the future. The strategic security environment I assumed is a multi-polar world with threats and capabilities across the operational continuum. Fiscal constraints will be a key factor in our future but we are in a position to handle it if we are creative and take advantage of our current strengths. It is important to understand what our nation's leaders want our Army to do if we are to provide the right force for the future. My methodology will be to review the process that Col. (Ret) Art Lykke describes as the ends, ways, and means needed to accomplish our mission. I will review our national security interests and objectives as established by the President, from this will flow a national military strategy to provide the concepts for accomplishing the mission. Next must come a doctrinally-based structure to meet the anticipated needs of the Airland Operations of the future. I have offered three alternatives that are changes from our current divisional structure: the first is the currently suggested TRADOC structure which is basically an unchanged division; the second includes a brigade and smaller divisional overhead; and, the third suggests elimination of the division headquarters completely. After comparing advantages and disadvantages of each I have concluded that a fine tuning of our current structure is all that is required and major alterations are unnecessary.

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine the division's structure as we look to the Army of 1995 and beyond. I start with the premise that the division, as it has been since World War I, will remain as our base for maneuver. I also recognize that any changes made in a division may require changes to corps structure above it as well as the brigades within it. Thus as I develop my concept, I will offer a recommended corps support structure that might be associated with my division. In addition, any changes I make to the division would naturally affect its major subordinate maneuver elements, the brigades. Here too, I will illustrate what these changes may look like.

The environment that shapes my proposals will contain three primary elements: (1) the reduction of the defense budget and thus a need to reduce the size of our Army, (2) the changing national security strategy and national military strategy that supports it, and (3) the evolving concepts of Airland Operations - Future (ALO-F) as the doctrine that will shape our operational planning and execution in the future.

After a brief review of the ups and downs of the budget and its impact on the size of our Army, I will review our national security interests as established by the President and the corresponding national military strategy as I see it.

Next will be a review of the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) vision of our Army. I will discuss some of the current

thinking on the doctrine of the future that should ultimately drive any redesigning we might undertake.

After presenting several options to accommodate these changes outlined above, I will propose a fine tuning of our division structure that should be able to meet the requirements for any future missions our Army might have to face.

#### LOOKING BACK TO REMEMBER

It should come as no surprise to any of us that our Army is about to undergo a major directed reduction. Changes in the assessment of the threat to our national interests as well as budgetary pressures will certainly result in a smaller defense budget and thus mandate a smaller force. This is, however, a change that we have seen after each successful war (be it "hot" or "cold"). Thus we should be able to learn from those who have managed these changes before us. Many have spoken about learning from history or from past mistakes. I believe retired General Donn Starry may have had the right perspective when he saw history's purpose was "to improve our judgments of the future; to constitute an informed vision; guide our idea of where we want to go; how best to get from where we are to where we believe we must be."<sup>1</sup>

So if we are to have this "informed" vision, I believe it is worthwhile to see if similarities exist with what our Army has had to do and what we are faced with in the near future.

As was the case following past conflicts, the world found itself facing a shift in the world order. We hear this same rhetoric, of a "new world order" today. While we have seen a reduction of forces following every major conflict, I believe the traumatic changes in the world as a result of the victory in the Cold War will be comparable to those we faced after the two world wars earlier in the century.

Three things became very obvious to me when researching these past reductions: (1) the reductions were large and traumatic, (2) the Army tended to fare worse than its sister services in absorbing these reductions, however, (3) the force that was to be downsized was very large, modern, and well trained and thus in as good a posture as it could be to manage the change and still accomplish its mission. I think we can safely conclude that the same holds true for our own impending reductions.

Currently we are talking of a reduction of our active Army to approximately 535,000 men and women with a reserve component force of nearly 600,000 supplementing it. Interestingly enough, in the early 1920s the Army leadership envisioned a force of similar size and composition. As might have been expected, Congress was neither politically inclined nor budgetarily able to support a force of this size.

Once again, after victory in the Second World War, a frustratingly massive and traumatic downsizing was required. From a wartime high of 8 million, by 1 January 1947, the Army had been reduced to only 1 million men and this figure included the Army Air Force, which accounted for 40 percent of the total.<sup>2</sup>

The Draft was to be terminated in 2 months, the beginnings of the Cold War were obvious to generals like Marshall and Eisenhower and yet the Army and indeed all the services, were once again unable to convince a determined Congress not to cut the budget and thus cut the force. The chart below demonstrates the relative size our forces have varied over the years with regards to conflict.<sup>3</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Def Budget</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1919	11.0 Bil	2.9 Mil
(WWI)		
1924	357 Mil	261,000
1945	82.9 Bil	12.1 Mil
(WWII)		
1948	9.1 Bil	1.44 Mil
1953	52.8 Bil	3.6 Mil
(Korea)		
1955	42.7 Bil	2.9 Mil
1968	78.0 Bil	3.5 Mil
(RVN)		
1974	79.3 Bil	2.1 Mil
1988	290 Bil	2.1 Mil
1991	295.1 Bil	1.976 Mil

With the certainty of a smaller force facing us, it appears to me that it will become more and more important for our senior military leaders to have a clear understanding of not only the lessons of the past, but also a bright vision of the future.

With this in mind, we now need to look at the strategic security environment we can expect to have to work in as we determine the appropriate "downsized structure" of 1995 and beyond.

## THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE FUTURE

It is important for anyone who intends to be visionary, to be aware of our stated national security interests; the corresponding national military objectives to support those interests; and, then the strategic concepts developed to execute the strategy. Only then, after understanding the Ends and Ways of our national military strategy, can we get to our bottom line. This bottom line is the Means or Resources (tempered by acceptable risk) desired by us and finally authorized by Congress to accomplish the mission.

I have used a number of sources and notes to help me understand the strategic security environment. These included lectures by Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., USA, Retired; the National Security Strategy of the United States published and signed by the President;<sup>4</sup> as well as assorted Airland Operations - Future conceptual studies.

Our national interests with associated objectives are broad but can best be summed up as follows:

- a. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation,

b. A healthy and expanding U.S. economy that ensures opportunity for free enterprise and individual prosperity at home and abroad,

c. A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions, and

d. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and other friendly nations.

These interest statements are nothing new. In fact, they've been around since World War II. Some might ask what affect do these national interests have on the force structure of the Army. To this challenge I would argue that it is especially important, when looking to the future, that our senior military leaders have a good grasp and understanding of them as they develop a national military strategy to support and implement these objectives. It is, after all, this national military strategy that will provide the Army its mission and concept and thus provide the impetus to develop doctrine and structure to execute the overall strategy.

Our senior military leaders have developed a national military strategy. Briefly, it has established the following generalized strategic military objectives:

a. to deter war or to fight it if deterrence fails by maintaining a force that is affordable. This force must therefore have an active and reserve component mix.

b. To be credible this force must be deployable to protect U.S. interests and it must be lethal and sustainable to be a viable element of persuasive national power.

c. Finally, this force must be designed so that it is versatile enough to provide the NCA with a range of options when dealing with a series of threat possibilities that cover the operational continuum from peacetime nation assistance to global nuclear war.

If the total force our national leaders envision, is one that will be employed not only in a joint configuration but equally probable in a coalition with friends and allies, what should the Army structure focus on for the future?

#### THE ARMY OF 1995 AND BEYOND

As stated earlier, the size of our military force is scheduled to diminish under the current authorization bill, falling to 1,976,405 in fiscal 1991 and to 1,613,000 by fiscal 1995.<sup>5</sup> So after reviewing the stated national security strategy and national military objectives to support it, are we now free to design the third leg of our stool? That is, can we plan to have the "means" or "resources" that we will need to get the job done?

Unfortunately, we do not work in an unconstrained fiscal reality. Not only can we expect a reduction in dollars, but we must also live with the advice and direction we will receive from the 535 members/advisers in Congress, each of whom has an idea on how best to execute the strategy laid down by the NCA. This, of course, assumes they support that strategy to begin with. Let's assume for the sake of this paper that we at least have a

consensus on the ends and ways so that we can expect that the guidance given on the resourcing side will be based on the same assumptions we must use.

Congress, in the fiscal 1991 defense authorization bill signed by the president, stated: "...The active military forces will be significantly reduced...The Department of Defense should shift a greater share of force structure and budgetary resources to the reserve components of the armed forces..."<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, former Army Chief of Staff, retired General John A. Wickham, said: "Given the nature of the multi-polar world we face...Congress should be rather cautious in setting end strengths" for active-duty forces.<sup>7</sup>

So if we are to be able to provide our nation an Army that is able to protect our national security interest we can not be forced into letting it decline into something that is only prepared to defend the East and West Coasts of the United States. We must create a contingency Army that is flexible and capable of rapid, worldwide deployment. There seems to be support for this approach in Congress at least in a broad sense.

The Senate Armed Services Committee said in reporting out its version of the fiscal 1991 defense authorization bill: Top priority should go to "forces that are inherently mobile and rapidly deployable: maritime-based expeditionary forces, long-range and tactical air forces and light forces...."<sup>8</sup>

The House Armed Services Committee, in drafting its authorization bill, also called for restructuring to give the armed services a longer, quicker reach in the post-Cold War

world. But Chairman Les Aspin (D-WI) said that, "while House members know there must be a new role for the U.S. military in the 1990s, they have not decided what that role should be, other than the general conviction that forces be smaller, lighter, faster and more lethal so they can reach a world trouble spot in a hurry and have enough punch to influence the outcome of events there."<sup>9</sup>

If our legislators have this as their vision of our military, has our senior leadership attempted to describe their view of the future? I think the answer to this is, a resounding yes! In his White Paper, "The United States Army, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond," our Chief of Staff has identified what he believes "...are the essential attributes of today's trained and ready Army...." He also "...projects a vision of the Army of tomorrow--an Army shaped and prepared to meet the broad range of challenges that will confront our nation in the 1990s and beyond."<sup>10</sup>

In this paper, the CSA lists three elements he sees as key to the successful design of our future Army. "The Army of the future will have to be versatile, deployable, and lethal."<sup>11</sup> I would like to look at each of these because it will be the litmus test which any proposals for restructuring must pass or for justifying current structure as we downsize and thus reorganize our Army.

Versatility is listed first because it is seen as the key to future successes for our Army. "Versatility will require the right proportion of Active and Reserve Components, the correct

mix of forces (heavy, light, and special operations), adequate sustainment stocks, and, above all, high quality in all aspects of the force."<sup>12</sup>

As we have seen earlier, our national security interests require not only for us to be prepared to protect our way of life here in the United States but also those vital interests so directly linked to our economic survival. Our military objectives to support this end stated we would be a force capable of ensuring that the NCA has the capability to act to retain these interests if he chooses or is forced to do so. Consequently, the Army of the future "will require an Active Component sufficiently large and capable of providing both the forward-deployed elements and the U.S.-based forces needed for immediate contingencies and rapid reinforcement of forward-deployed units...in the Army Reserve and National Guard, we will maintain those combat and support units required to sustain the operations of the active forces beyond a presently defined critical period."<sup>13</sup>

If versatility is essential to enabling our Army to meet all of its challenges, then the ability to rapidly deploy this tailored force, to meet the given contingency, is clearly the next most important element for any force structure of the future.

Again our own CSA has stated his vision on this point when he said, "The nature of the United States' interest around the world, and its coalition-based strategy, will require that U.S. forces be globally deployable, often with little or no warning,

from the United States or from forward bases."<sup>14</sup> He is even more specific in his vision of the capabilities of our future force when he states, "The U.S. will also have to maintain an unquestionable ability to conduct an opposed entry into combat in defense of vital interests anywhere. In many contingencies, a forced entry will only be possible, or will best be achieved, by air."<sup>15</sup>

Thus when we get to designing the force structure of our Army of the future, it must not only be able to deal with the full range of conflict from nation assistance to nuclear war, it must also be able to take its versatility and move by air or sea to wherever it might be needed.

But what about the threat? It will do us no good to be able to configure or tailor our force and to deploy it rapidly to the trouble spot if when it gets there, it is unable to defeat the enemy. After all, the bottom line of our national security strategy may be to deter war but if that fails, the only acceptable outcome after that is to win the conflict at whatever level it may take.

This brings us to the third element of our CSA's vision, "lethality is the assured capability to defeat an opponent, winning as quickly as possible while preserving our most valued asset--the lives of our soldiers."<sup>16</sup> The Army of the 1990s and beyond must be structured to incorporate whatever technologies our modernization programs will provide. We must be able to integrate "system of systems" to ensure our forces, though smaller in number, can substitute the multipliers that precision

weapons, advanced information collectors and other technological advantages will be providing them.

So what then is the cement that will bound together this vision of a versatile, deployable, and lethal Army? Once again, in his White Paper, General Vuono has stated, "in the 1990s and beyond, concepts and doctrine must guide our efforts to field combat-ready forces...The Army has launched the AirLand Operations - Future (ALO-F) initiative which is designed to update all our warfighting concepts for the early twenty-first century."<sup>17</sup> If, then, our future concept is the foundation upon which we are to build our future Army I would now like to review what that future doctrine is all about.

#### AIRLAND OPERATIONS - FUTURE

What is the current thought about future warfighting at the operational and tactical levels? A recent ALO-F Umbrella Concept study states, "instead of Army groups and armies designing campaigns, corps and divisions will have greater roles at the operational level."<sup>18</sup>

If the doctrinal concept, which advocates the focus of campaign planning on corps, divisions and brigades, is to be the foundation upon which we build our structure, then we need to ensure our force design and modernization effort keeps this in focus as we work out the reduction and shifting of forces as a result of budget reductions, and changes from a forward deployed to a contingency Army.

The challenges we face, however, lie once again in that perennial bottom line, the budget. "The Army budget request, submitted to Congress February 4, 1991, calls for \$71.1 billion in spending authority in 1992 and \$67.7 billion in 1993...the personnel portion of the budget makes sharp cuts in active, reserve and civilian staffing."<sup>19</sup>

How does all of this affect the current ALO-F concept? The answer is in a design that can support our division-based doctrine and still accommodate "personnel cuts that require the inactivation of six divisions by 1993, and another four in 1994-95. This means that the Army ultimately would be organized into 12 active divisions--eight heavy and four light--and six reserve divisions. This is a dramatic reduction from our current 18 active and 10 reserve divisions."<sup>20</sup> These 28 divisions are supported by 5 Corps, giving us a corps for every 5 to 6 divisions (this does not include separate brigades both active and reserve component). No mention of reducing Corps Headquarters has been found in my research yet it would seem appropriate. As we get further into this discussion of the role of the division both in a reduced structure and as doctrinally employed in ALO-F, I will discuss the role of the corps as it relates to divisions, since both current and future versions of FM 100-5, Operations have the corps as their focus.

Aside from the focus on the corps, the other major changes in ALO-F is the deemphasis of the Central European linear battlefield and the recognition that conflicts leading to wars in the future will be fought using a more nonlinear approach than in

the past. Thus any future force structure changes should be designed to improve agility and the ability to fight with greater separation and over a more open battlefield.

If we are to accommodate this ability to disperse and quickly concentrate our forces, a key element to our structure may very well be how we configure our combat support and combat service support elements to ensure we can sustain our fight. Currently, "the division is the lowest level at which combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units are mixed."<sup>21</sup>

Where does ALO-F leave us? We have said that "Corps are the Army's largest tactical units, the instruments with which higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the operational level."<sup>22</sup> Divisions are "fixed combined arms organizations of 8 to 11 maneuver battalions, 3 to 4 FA Battalions and other CS and CSS units, capable of performing any tactical mission and designed to be largely self-sustaining."<sup>23</sup>

Finally, when asked in a recent interview, what affect the nonlinear battlefield might have on our future structure, General Foss, the CG TRADOC stated, "Right now we need to focus on a combined arms organization and we think a combined arms brigade makes a fair amount of sense...."<sup>24</sup> "Why the brigade? Because we think we need to integrate maneuver, combat support and combat service support at every level. Right now we don't do it at every level. Right now we do it at the division. We think we need to do that at a lower level. What a combined arms brigade gives you is the ability to fight side by side in a linear

fashion, or if you have to, to put a combined arms force into a more nonlinear situation where you may not have people on your flanks. That gives you a cohesive team that has maneuver and combat support, artillery and engineers and combat service support."<sup>25</sup>

In the next chapter, I will examine this corps, division, brigade structure and offer three options we might consider to absorb the coming force reductions and yet design a contingency army that can fight within the tenets of ALO-F and win.

### THREE STRUCTURAL OPTIONS

The three options I will discuss are first and foremost conceptual starting points for a more detailed analysis by TRADOC and eventual structure decisions by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The breadth and scope of this one-man effort will in no way provide the answer on division restructuring but hopefully will at least provide some conceptual parameters to be further studied. In any case, I will make a plea up front for a commitment from our senior leadership to thoroughly test the recommended structural changes before they are implemented. I would suggest that a methodology discussed by General M. Thurman would be appropriate.<sup>26</sup> He called it the "7th Infantry Division Model." This model has been used to test new concepts in the past and if used in conjunction with our Combat Training Centers should validate any newly structured division concept that might be proposed.

Before I address the three options for division restructuring, it is important to understand that none of these division structures are intended to be able to stand alone. In this respect they are similar to our current division structure in that they are intended to operate within an Army Corps. The corps will remain the base organization, capable of command and control and sustaining Army tactical units (divisions and brigades). A typical corps could include heavy and light divisions as well as appropriate CS units as shown in figure 1. How many artillery, aviation and other type units would be assigned to the corps would depend upon the corps' mission and the number and type of assigned divisions. In fact, no one corps in the Army will be the same. In the three options I propose, the corps will continue to be an organization tailored by the commander based upon the situation and his mission analysis as to his particular needs. It will continue to be the commander's responsibility to task organize these forces to support his divisions and brigades on either a linear or nonlinear battlefield. It will be equally important for the force designers to provide our forward deployed, contingency, and reinforcing corps commanders the right forces, probably a mix of active and reserve components, that they would need. Those needs will be based on projected scenarios, contingency plans, and regional orientations and assessments, taking into consideration the current and projected capabilities of potential threats against which we may need to employ military power.

Another key element to consider when redesigning our division is the Corps Support Command (COSCOM). As depicted in figure 2, our COSCOM will use multi-functional support groups to back up our divisions. These groups can be made up by combining current service, transportation, medical, and maintenance units to save us additional force structure. They would provide area coverage and unit distribution at least to the division's forward support battalions and dependent on the situation even lower if required. I do not intend to get into a detailed discussion on logistics or sustainment techniques however as will be seen, they are key considerations in any new division structure, and would demand thorough evaluation prior to any final decisions by the CSA.

With this as background, the first option for the future division's structure is a conservative one. It is the front runner in most of the recent ALO-F studies.<sup>27</sup> As portrayed in figure 3, this division looks much like our current one. It has incorporated the engineer regiment and downgraded aviation. With this division base, the essential C<sup>3</sup>I functions can be provided as well as the combat support and combat service support linkage between the brigades and the corps.

This division structural as shown in figure 3 depicts a combined arms brigade. This would enhance nonlinear operations while certainly retaining the ability to conduct linear operations. A scout platoon is included to enhance the brigade commander's reconnaissance capability. This proposal would have

the combat elements permanently assigned to the brigade while placing the CS and CSS units in direct support.

An analysis of this proposal results in the following:

#### ADVANTAGES

- Performs traditional C<sup>3</sup>I functions
- Provides adequate CS and CSS
- Air defense battalion can act as division airspace management element (DAME)
- Engineer regiment provides planning and integration of of brigade, division, and corps mobility and counter-mobility efforts
- Division artillery (DIVARTY) acts as division fire support coordinator to mass all indirect fires available in the division's sector.
- Cavalry squadron provides responsive security and reconnaissance effort for the division commander.
- Facilitate peacetime training effort in CS and CSS units by retaining them under parent commands (i.e., FSBs in DISCOM, etc.)
- Attack/recon aviation battalion provides responsive fire support and aerial recon to divisions.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- Does not significantly address force reductions and thus may not be supportable in the resource constrained environment of the future.

- Downsizes the aviation brigade, moving most of its resources to corps, thus reducing responsiveness to the division, as well as degrading the division's ability to integrate aviation resources when they are made available from corps.
- Direct support relationship of CS and CSS units within brigades does not allow complete control of all task force elements in a brigade by commander. This would reduce efficiency during nonlinear operations.
- Lacks capability to sustain itself independent of corps CS and CSS yet retains redundant CS and CSS elements at brigade and division level, both of which are also present at corps.
- Size in both personnel and equipment reduces rapid deployability necessary in our contingency based military strategy of the future.

In summary, this division structure would provide some autonomy to its brigades in combined arms relationships but not very much CS and CSS independence due to the Direct Support relationship. While it has been made leaner, it is still dependent on the corps for long-term sustainability and remains difficult to deploy.

My second option significantly reduces the division structure above the brigades, as shown in figure 4. This leaner division could be reduced to no more than an enhanced Headquarters and Headquarters Company composed of C<sup>3</sup>I, fire support, logistical support and signal support sections. The

C<sup>3</sup>I section would perform its traditional role of command, control, and intelligence integration. The other three sections would be reduced in grade structure and equipment and merely plan for and coordinate the integration of corps support to the enhanced brigades.

Along with this reduced headquarters would be more autonomous brigades capable of independent action (see figure 4). Added to the brigade would be two elements: a signal section, capable of integrating with corps elements using the newly fielded Multiple Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and/or satellite communication terminals, and a Military Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (MI/EW) section to provide dedicated radar, sensor, and intelligence integration activities. Significantly, in this proposal, all elements of the brigade would be assigned not DS. This would place the entire task force under the brigade commander for readiness and training. This proposal would make the brigade commander the rating officer for all the elements in his command.

An analysis of this proposal results in the following:

#### ADVANTAGES

- Reduces size of division overall by eliminating redundant CS and CSS elements such as DIVARTY and DISCOM headquarters, as well as unaffordable elements such as the band.
- Concentrates other CS and CSS units at brigade or corps level where they can be better used, eliminating an unnecessary layer at division.

## DISADVANTAGES

- No assigned CS or CSS resources other than those attached to the brigades to provide backup or to allow division commander to weight his main effort. Must depend on Corps to provide additional CS and CSS support.

- Resupply effort must be pushed from Corps to forward brigades with no holding capability at division.

- Brigade training plans are complicated by the inclusion of such a wide range of units under the control of the brigade.

This option provides a lean, rapidly deployable division made up of robust, self-sustaining brigades that can respond to small contingencies such as Grenada; reinforce and plug into forward corps such as in Korea or expand into a larger conflict that would require the entire contingency corp to be deployed. In most instances it will provide the concentration of force where and when it would be needed and be able to adapt to either linear or nonlinear conflicts.

The third option I would offer takes the next step in this progression when addressing the division structure - it eliminates it entirely. I found an approach to doing this written by LTC Charles W. Treese. He suggests that while it is true that some scenarios will require exclusively heavy or light forces, most will require a mix of both. His proposals call for separate combat brigades under the control of a corps headquarters. This would provide the NCA the flexibility to respond to a crisis as he sees fit as well as the corps commander to task organize his force to the battlefield situation.<sup>28</sup>

The brigades in this model would look much like those of option two. Our corps and COSCOM would remain essentially the same with possibly some additional C<sup>3</sup>I augmentation to allow for the additional span of control now placed on it.

In addition to this tactical role, LTC Treese would charge the corps headquarters with training and readiness responsibilities within their geographic area. Upon deployment, the corps would be force packaged with the appropriate type and number of brigades to meet the commanders requirements based on his campaign concept and mission analysis.<sup>29</sup> Exactly how many brigades a corps could efficiently command and control is uncertain, but I would suggest nine to fifteen would be possible. This, like any task organization, would be mission and terrain dependent.

An analysis of this proposal results in the following:

#### ADVANTAGES

- Reduces force structure considerably over options one and two while retaining the combat power of the current divisions by concentrating it in the brigades.

- On the nonlinear battlefield a Corps to brigade C<sup>3</sup>I and support linkage would be manageable and may even facilitate the synchronization of Deep, Close and Rear battle operation by consolidating all under Corps control.

- Brigade sized, self-sustaining forces, trained and prepared to work independently should be more able to be employed anywhere anytime thus providing a more flexible and responsive military force.

## DISADVANTAGES

- C<sup>3</sup>I at Corps level stretched.
- Requires additions at corps to provide adequate synchronization of CS and CSS planning and execution.
- Additions required at brigade and corps may offset savings gained by elimination of division headquarters.
- Asking corps commander to be both an operational and tactical commander may be too much.

This option is certainly the most radical of the three and with the technical increases in C<sup>3</sup>I capabilities it may be feasible on paper. What will require a thorough review is the stress placed on the leadership that this option requires. The gap between brigade commanders at the colonel level and corps commanders at the three star level is wide indeed.

This gap warrants careful review and thought before we venture too far with this concept.

## CONCLUSION

I have concluded that our choices for future structure are going to be difficult and will require bold leaders who have the vision and fortitude to take risks in order to make a change. After all, we've won two World Wars and one Cold War structured as we are, so why try to fix something that doesn't appear to be broken? My point, however, is that changes in the strategic security environment and refocus of our Army as a responsive

contingency force will require more than changes on the margin to downsize our force.

For this reason I rejected the status quo of option one (figure 3). My principal concerns with this structure are threefold. First, I'm convinced that, while it is the largest in structure and thus may appear to be the most capable, it in fact lacks the capability to sustain itself in the nonlinear environment visioned in ALO-F concepts. Flexibility and deployability are going to be key elements for our contingency based army of the future. This is my second concern with this option. The size of this division will slow its deployment and require a large amount of sea and airlift to move. Finally, the reality of our future army's structure is not going to be settled by merely reducing it to twenty divisions. The divisions themselves must be reduced to keep our Army below the 535K ceiling we are facing, and option one will not provide any significant personnel savings.

I've also rejected option three (figure 5) because while I call for bold, risk taking senior leadership, my research leads me to conclude that the complete elimination of the division as an echelon providing C<sup>3</sup>I and sustainment planning and integration is too radical. While we certainly reduce personnel and equipment, which is one of the primary purposes of this study, I see too much risk being taken regarding warfighting capability. The burden of C<sup>3</sup>I and sustainment of nine to fifteen brigades by a corps headquarters will be too much and more than likely would be resolved by increasing the size of the

corps headquarters thus negating our efforts in the long run. Of equal concern is the similar burden placed on the brigade commander and his staff. This option would increase the resourcing burden on the commander whose primary focus should be close combat. Causing a brigade commander to plan and coordinate with the corps and to compete for the attention of the corps staff with 8 to 14 other co-equal elements would be too distracting and severely degrade the brigade's focus.

I therefore have concluded that our best choice is option two (figure 4). Clearly this option is going to reduce structure which satisfies part of my intent. While the reduction in the divisional element not assigned to the brigade's drastically reduces the resources immediately available to the division commander, the area support available from corps should be able to take up the mission. Assignment of a tailored force at brigade level, all working directly for the brigade commander, will facilitate the integration of peacetime training and readiness. It will also insure a smooth transition to war if the brigade is deployed, particularly if it finds itself on a non-linear battlefield that will call for a well-trained, integrated force able to work in a synchronized manner. Also by retaining the commanding general along with a staff to provide the C<sup>3</sup>I and sustainment linkage to corps, we free the brigades to fight and preclude the overburdening that might result if we choose to eliminate the division completely.

Finally, whatever the recommendation may be from TRADOC, that will result in force structure decisions by the CSA, we must

keep in mind that "our nation expects an Army that can go where it needs to go to do what must be done and in so doing, ensure so far as possible the safety and welfare of its soldiers. This can only be accomplished with an Army that is strategically, operationally and tactically mobile, lethal, and one that is trained and maintained to be in a warfighting posture all the time."<sup>32</sup> I'm convinced that the concept that I have proposed will help us meet our congressionally-mandated reductions while still retaining an Army able to fight and win on the battlefields of the future.

## ENDNOTES

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


FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2







FIGURE 3



**F I G U R E 4**



**FIGURE 5**